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During the period 2000-2004 central banks sustained a generalized reduction in their 
staff, which was accompanied, in most cases, with significant increases in staff costs. 
This could obey to an enhanced interest of central banks in focusing on their core 
functions. In fact, central banks have changed the ways they perform their operative 
functions (e.g. currency operations, payment systems operation, printing notes, etc.) 
through different strategies aimed at gathering the participation of third parties. These 
strategies differ according to the relationship that central banks have with the financial 
sector and the government, as well as to their historical tradition and modernization 
trend. To explain the effect of these changes on the staff, we estimated a short-term labor 
demand function for 66 central banks using a panel data model with random effects. 
Results indicate that central banks’ labor demand is strongly determined by the country’s 
population, economic development level and changes in operative functions, as well as 
by staff costs. In addition, we found a low employment-wage elasticity suggesting the 
presence of a flexible budgetary constrain in central banks.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION  
 
      How  many  employees  should  a  central bank have? What determines its labor 
demand? What are the central bank’s staff costs? These questions have always been of 
particular interest to central banks, governments and multilateral organizations alike, but 
they have increased in significance in the past few years with the formation of the 
European Central Bank and the quest for efficiency in OECD central banks
1.  
      In fact, when we examine these staffs we can see that the number of employees 
differs widely between central banks. In the year 2004 the US Federal Reserve (FED) 
had 20,217 employees, whereas New Zealand’s central bank operated with 
approximately 250 employees. In Latin America, Brazil’s central bank employed 4,629 
people, whereas Chile’s had under 600. These differences also persist in some other 
developing countries, (e.g., Thailand’s central bank operates with about 4,500 employees 
and Bulgaria’s with around 1,000). 
      The empirical evidence suggests that these differences do not reside exclusively on 
the size of the population or the characteristics of the economy but also on the number of 
functions developed by central banks (Vaubel, 1997; 2002). In an extensive work, Banco 
de la República (2005) has studied the functions carried out by 133 central banks and 
found out that operative functions (i.e., financial supervision, cash distribution, operation 
of retail payment systems, and banknotes printing) are more labor-intensive and therefore 
have the greatest impact on labor demand at central banks.  
      From  the  theoretical  standpoint,  staff costs should be taken into account when 
estimating labor demand (Hamermesh, 1993). To this respect, Brione (2005) compared 
the staff costs of 28 OECD central banks, and found wide differences (e.g., the central 
banks of Austria, Italy and Poland have an average cost per employee three times higher 
than that of the central banks of New Zealand, Ireland and the Czech Republic). 
According to the author, these differences can be largely attributed to the heterogeneity 
in the functions performed by central banks
2.  
      In this context, the present paper intends to find the determinants of labor demand at 
central banks, and to estimate the staff that these institutions require by taking into 
                                                 
1 Wellink, et. al., (2002) have identified improvements in efficiency attainable by National European 
Central Banks after the centralization of several functions by the European Central Bank. In the same way, 
McKinley and Banaian (2005) have studied central bank’s functions and its modernization trend in several 
OECD countries with the aim to identifying operational efficiency. 
 
2 On this particular subject, the Governor of Sweden’s Central Bank, Mr. Lars Heikensten, has emphasized 
on the need of central banks becoming involved with cost-efficiency and to be more focused on their core 
functions (See, Heikensten, 2003).     4
account how they carry out their operative functions, their staff costs, and the 
characteristics of the economy where they operate. To this effect, 78 central banks of 
different regions with information from the 2000-2004 period are studied, and the staff is 
estimated for 66 banks on which additional information could be obtained on their staff 
costs.  
      Thus, this paper wishes to contribute to the body of literature on central banks in 
three major aspects. First, we identify the usual strategies developed by central banks in 
the performance of their operative functions. In the theoretical aspect, we construct a real 
wages’  proxy in order to characterize the labor-demand function and to validate the 
assumption of the flexible budgetary restriction of central banks. Finally, as to 
methodology, we use a panel data model with random effects that contemplates the 
differences between central banks while at the same time allowing to identify the impact 
generated on the staff by changes introduced in their functions. 
      The  paper  is  composed  of  four  sections including this introduction. Section 2 
discusses the recent evolution of central banks’ staff, functions and staff costs. Section 3 
describes the theoretical aspects of labor demand, reviews the empirical evidence for 
central banks, and the statement of the model. Also shows the results of the model and 
the staff estimations for central banks. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2.   STAFF, FUNCTIONS, AND STAFF COSTS AT CENTRAL BANKS 
 
      This section presents some facts that show how the gradual adjustment in central 
banks’ staffs has been accompanied with changes in their operative functions and 
increases in staff costs. For a better comparative analysis, the selected sample was 
divided into three subgroups with homogeneous characteristics; two of them by similar 
degree of economic development, and the other one by geographic region. 
 
2.1. EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL BANKS STAFF (2000 – 2004) 
 
A.  Advanced Economies 
 
      This  group  comprises  the  central  banks of 30 countries that share as a common 
characteristic a per capita income of above USD 10,000 per year, according to the 
classification in IMF (2005). In this group, central banks with the highest number of 
employees were the FED, which after an approximately 13% reduction during the period, 
ended the year 2004 with 20,217 employees. Next in size are the central banks of France,   5
Germany, and Italy, which are characterized by having an extensive presence at the 
national level. However, these central banks have also made important reductions in their 
staffs in the past few years; in particular, the reduction carried out by the German central 
bank (2,200 employees) is worth noting.  
      During  the  period  under  study,  the  largest staff reductions were presented in the 
central banks of Canada (26%), England (23%) and Finland (19%). In contrast, the most 
significant increases occurred in Qatar (71%), Ireland (49%) and Luxembourg (27%). In 
this group, the central banks of New Zealand, Luxembourg, and Iceland are notorious for 
their small staffs, with less than 250 employees each. In the year 2004, this group had an 
average of 2,957 employees, i.e., 8.3% below the figure of 3,226 for the year 2000 (See 
Figure 1). 
 
B.  Latin America 
 
      This  group  is  conformed  by  central banks from 17 South and Central American 
countries, including Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Within this group, the central 
bank of Brazil had the largest staff, with 4,629 employees in 2004. It’s remarkable that 
almost all central banks in this region made staff reductions, with the cases of Ecuador 
(39,2%) and El Salvador (21%) largely being associated with the dollarization of these 
economies in the years 2003 and 2001, respectively. Significant employee reductions 
also took place in the Dominican Republic and Colombia, of about 23% and 12%, 
respectively.  The average number of employees of this region’s central banks went 
down from 1,575 in the year 2000 to 1,434 by the end of 2004, representing an 
adjustment of approximately 9%.  
 
C.  Other Developing Countries 
 
      This subgroup is composed of 31 central banks from countries with an annual per 
capita income of below USD 10,000 in 2004, and not pertaining to the Latin American 
region. Notorious for their large size are the central banks of Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia and Poland, all of which have more than 5,000 employees each. At their turn, 
the banks of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Estonia are worth mentioning for having less 
than 300 employees. During the period, important staff reductions took place at the 
central banks of Rumania (47%), Nepal (39%) and Hungary (27%).  
 
   6
 
Figure 1.  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Banks Annual Reports and the Central Bank Directory (2000-2004)   7
      It’s noticeable that several of these countries are recent members of the European 
Union or candidates to become members
3. In contrast, the central banks of Serbia, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Georgia and Macedonia, have seen their staffs increase in more than 
40%. However, the average size of the staff in this group had a 8% decrease, going from 
2,117 employees in the year 2000 down to 1,948 in 2004. 
 
2.2. FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS  
 
      Functions developed by central banks are directly related to a wide array of goals, the 
most common of which are: To preserve the internal value of the national currency, to 
manage the country’s international reserves, to look after the country’s financial stability, 
to secure a safe and efficient payment system, and to guarantee the issue and circulation 
of currency (See Fisher, 1994; De Hann and Kooi, 2000). Several of these objectives are 
related to a group of functions that, due to the related activities, are labor intensive. These 
functions are: financial supervision, currency operations, banknotes printing, coin 
minting, and payment systems operation. 
      Since these are operational functions that, in some cases, involve a moderate degree 
of risk, central banks have implemented modernization strategies aimed at gathering the 
involvement of the private sector for their development. Recent experiences also suggest 
the lack of a consensus about whether central banks should or not carry out these 
functions or on how they should perform them, these issues depends mostly on their 




A.  Financial Supervision 
 
      The supervision of the financial system is one of the functions that, for reasons of the 
country’s institutional organization, has been delegated from the beginning to central 
banks, or has been the responsibility of a separate state-owned entity. That is why this 
particular function has not sustained any significant changes in its administration
5. 
                                                 
3 On May 1
st 2004 ten new countries became members of the European Union (i.e., Cyprus, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and The Czech Republic); today, three more 
candidates are about to become members: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. 
 
4 For example, it is common in Latin America to find central banks that develop some type of cultural 
activity due to the historical support they have given to their country on these particular matters. However, 
the scope of these activities is very limited in most countries (See Annex 2).   
 
5 Although no administrative changes have taken place, it is worth noting that the ways to supervise the 
financial system have in fact sustained significant changes due to the growth of this sector, market   8
      There is neither a clear trend in the performance of this function nor a wide consensus 
on who should take care of it. However, there are some arguments in favor of central 
banks performing it. First, in order to fulfill its role as last-instance lenders, central banks 
must have first-hand and detailed information on the solvency of commercial banks, and 
they could perform this function more efficiently if they gathered this information 
directly instead of having to request it from another entity (Peek et. al., 1999)
6. Another 
issue has to do with the potential scale economies that central banks may develop when 
they take care of that particular function, because they must monitor the movements of 
the financial system and for that task they usually have a Financial Stability Department 
(Green, 2003).  
      In order to review this trend, Figure 2 shows the percentage of central banks that 
performed this function in 2004 and its comparison with the year 2000. In the advanced 
economies group, about one half of these central banks supervise financial entities. 
Among these are central banks that carry out shared supervisory modalities, as in the case 
of Germany, where the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (FSSA) and the central 
bank share supervisory tasks, and the latter is in charge of issuing guidelines and 
regulations on this matter (For details see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2002).   
      During the period under study the only relevant change was the merger between 
Ireland’s Financial Supervising Authority and central bank that took place in the year 
2003, and that was arranged with the aim of taking advantage of synergies in common 
tasks and increasing the efficiency in the communication of information. In contrast with 
what occurred in Ireland, in 1997 England’s central bank surrendered its banking 
supervision functions to the Financial Services Superintendence
7.  
      In Latin America, financial supervision has been a role typically played by state-
owned entities. In this region, only the central banks of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
carry out this function. Contrary to this trend, in the group of other developing countries 
the supervision of financial entities is mostly a function of central banks. Only the central 
                                                                                                                                                 
globalization, and recent technological advances. For a complete revision of the structural changes in US 
financial regulation, see Freixas and Santomero (2002). 
 
6 In the same sense, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) argue that when an independent central bank 
perform the financial supervision, a more efficient response is likely to be given to the combined 
challenges of monetary and financial stability. (See also, Di Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999).   
 
7 Briault (2002) has shown that this change has been beneficial for the development of the financial sector 
in England.    9
banks of Turkey, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Estonia do not perform this task, the latter 
country delegated it to a state-owned entity by the end of the year 2003. 
       
 
Figure 2.  




  Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Banks Annual Reports and Central Bank Directory (2000-2004). 
                
 
 
B.  Currency Operations  
 
      Currency operations mainly involve cash handling, distribution, quality check, and 
destruction. To carry out these activities, central banks may apart themselves from the 
traditional model, that was characterized by the bank performing the whole activity with 
its own resources. More particularly, central banks may gather the partial or complete 
support from third parties, provided that a certain level of supervision is maintained (See 
Table 1)  
      Figure 3 shows the percentage of central banks that carry out all or most of currency 
operations, mainly following the traditional model. Central banks pertaining to advanced 
economies show a trend toward delegating some activities related to currency operations 
to third parties. However, most of them still follow a traditional model  (e.g., Spain, 
France, Italy, Germany, and US
8). 
                                                 
8 In an effort to minimise the cost of providing currency, the Federal Reserve recently issued for comments 
a note of a proposed policy that would involve the development of a custodial inventory program combined 























      During the period under analysis, the central banks of Austria, Finland and Norway 
delegated most of their currency operations through a participative model. In the year 
2001, the Austrian central bank created a joint-venture with commercial banks in the 
form of an independent enterprise that assumed all currency operations, with the 
exception of destruction. In the same year, the central bank of Norway delegated to the 
private firm Nokas all currency operations and the administration of its 9 branches, 
keeping to itself a third part of the shares in this company. Under a similar view, the 
Finland’s central bank generated a partnership with a cash-processing company owned 
by commercial banks.  
             
 
Table 1.  
Currency Operations Modalities 
 
 -Traditional Model: The central bank takes charge of all currency operations. 
 
 -Sharing Model: The central bank delegates part of these activities to a custodial entity, generally   
  related to commercial banks or to securities transporters. 
 
 -Participative Model: The central bank acts as stockholder in a private firm that assumes most of   
  these activities.  These  firms are  usually  created  at  the  central  bank’s  initiative,  seeking   to  
  establish  partnerships with financial  entities  or  specialized  firms. 
 
 -Freelance Operation: The central bank  has a minimum participation,  limiting itself only  to the     
  destruction   process,   and  leaving  to  third  parties  (e.g., private banks)  the   larger   currency    
  operations (i.e., cash handling, distribution, and quality  check). 
 
 
Source: Banco de la República (2005) and Central Banks Annual Reports. 
 
 
      In contrast, the central banks of New Zealand and Canada follow a sharing model, 
implementing the figure of custodial banks, through an association between commercial 
banks and securities transporting firms, whereas England and Ireland have adopted a 
freelance model where the market naturally assumes most currency operations
9. Hong 
Kong has an atypical modality amongst the central banks of this group, because the 
government there has authorized three commercial banks to issue, distribute, and destroy 
cash under a special regulation
10. 
                                                 
9 Baxter et al. (2005) provides an analysis of the different strategies used by central banks of Austria, 
Canada, England, Malaysia, and Norway to perform these currency operations. 
  
10 Commercial banks in charge of these activities are the Bank of China Ltd., Standard Chartered Bank 
Ltd., and The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd., which operate under a set of terms and 
conditions set forth by the government. For more details about operational functions in EMEAP central 
banks see Nishihara (2006).  
   11
       
Figure 3.  
Central Banks using a Traditional Currency Operations Model (2000, 2004)  
 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Banks Annual Reports (2000-2004)   
                
          
      About  65%  of  Latin  American  central  banks  adhere  primarily  to  the  traditional 
model, with the exceptions of Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, which use shared schemes. 
Distribution processes are carried out in Brazil through the branches network of Banco 
do Brasil, a state-owned bank with more than 1,800 branches in the whole national 
territory. Similarly, Brazil’s central bank is the only one in this region that does not carry 
out directly the banknote-destruction process. Mexico’s central bank gathers the support 
from commercial banks, which take care of this function through 549 branches since 
1996. Likewise, commercial banks and securities transporters in Chile perform banknotes 
exchange and quality check, whereas the central bank only performs notes destruction 
after a verification process of unfit banknotes (See, Leiva, 1998).  
      All central banks in the group of other developing countries, with the exception of 
Estonia and Malaysia, follow primarily a traditional model for currency operations. Some 
possible explanations for the prevalence of this model are the lack of integration with the 
financial sector and the size of the market, which has been insufficient to generate 
mechanisms that contribute to facilitate these processes.  
 
a) Branches for Currency Operations 
 
      Usually, whenever a central bank adheres closely to a traditional currency operations 
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widely between central banks due to diverse factors (e.g., geographic, demographic, or 
economic). Central banks that traditionally have had a wide network of branches are 
those from France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and Spain. However, in the past 
few years several of these banks have reduced the size of their networks and will 
continue to do so, but without abandoning their significant regional presence
11. 
      Germany’s  central  bank  has  implemented a restructuring plan for its network of 
branches, going down from 118 in the year 2000 to 85 in 2004, and will pursue this 
policy until only 47 branches are left in the year 2007. The French central bank closed 26 
branches during 2004, ending that year with 185, and the plan contemplates closing 115 
more branches between 2004 and 2006 in an attempt to reach a final network of just 96. 
Similarly, the central bank of Spain closed 30 branches between the years 2000 and 
2004, reaching its goal of a 22-branch network.  
      There  is  another  important  group  of  central banks that began to restructure their 
branches since the last decade. Among them, the Australian central bank reduced 
between 1998 and 2003 its network of 8 cash-distribution centers to just one that operates 
with the banknotes press. Likewise, the central bank of Canada went from 9 branches 
down to just 2 between 1993 and 1997. As for Latin America, Colombia’s central bank 
has closed 13 currency operations branches since 1997, with 15 remaining to date, 
whereas the central bank of Chile closed 9 branches since 1992 and only 2 are left 
today
12.  
      Most central banks in the group of other developing countries have not sustained 
significant reductions in their network of branches. Worth remarking due to their 
extensive networks are the central banks of Turkey (21), Morocco (20) and Poland (16), 
with the latter having created 3 additional branches since the year 2001. An interesting 
case is the branch structure of Thailand’s central bank, with three regional offices, each 
operating several independent currency operations and management centers. Under a 
similar scheme, the central bank of Indonesia manages 8 regional offices. 
 
                                                 
11 This network reduction has been implemented as the market in the cities where the central bank used to 
be present have started to create the mechanisms to assume these activities either by themselves or under 
contracts with other firms (Baxter, et. al., 2005). An assessing on the technical efficiency of the 37 
currency operations branches of the FED in the US can be seen in Bohn et. al. (2001). For a similar study 
in the central bank of Colombia, see Sarmiento (2005). 
 
12 For more details on this and other changes in the operative functions of Colombia’s central bank, see 
Annex 7.   
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C.  Banknotes Printing and Coin Minting 
 
      Banknotes  printing  and  coin  minting  are industrial functions associated with the 
central banks’ core task of issuing currency. There are several forms to meet the cash 
needs of a given economy. In some countries, either the central bank or the government 
are in charge of cash production; whereas in other countries, the central bank purchases 
the currency from private firms under contract or imports it from other countries.  
      Table 2 shows that the vast majority of central banks do not produce their national 
currency. For banknotes, primarily in advanced economies, a growing trend is observed 
toward assigning this function to private entities. During the period under analysis, the 
central banks of Sweden and England sold their banknote presses to private companies, 
the former to Crane & Co. Inc. in 2001 and the latter to De la Rue in 2003. Similarly, the 
central bank of Austria segregated the production of banknotes in a subsidiary that acts as 
a private enterprise since the year 2000
13.   
      Some other significant changes have taken place in the past few years. In 1999 the 
central bank of Portugal created a joint venture with De la Rue for the banknotes 
production
14. In 1998, Australia’s banknote press was established as a subsidiary of the 
central bank, which acts as a stockholder
15. In the same year, the Bank of Finland sold 
60% of the shares it owned in Setec Oy, an independent company established in 1991, 
when it segregated its banknote press. Unlike these countries, the banknotes printing in 
Hong Kong is performed by Hong Kong Note Printing, Ltd., an enterprise acquired by 
the central bank back in 1996. 
      Most Latin American countries import their banknotes, with only the central banks of 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela operating their own banknote presses. Banknote 
printing in Brazil and Chile are under the responsibility of the government, whereas in 
Argentina a private company performs this activity. No changes in the administration of 
this function have occurred in this region. However, it is important to remark that 
                                                 
13 In April 2001 the European Central Bank assigned to each one of the national central banks of the Euro 
zone the responsibility of producing certain denominations of banknotes with a view to guaranteeing a 
uniform level of quality and to allow the Eurosystem to take advantage of scale economies (ECB, 2003). 
 
14 The Carregado complex is a center specialized in banknote manufacture and cash distribution. Both 
Bank of Portugal’s Treasury & Issue Department and Valora, i.e., the banknote-production unit, operate 
inside this complex.   
 
15 Note Printing Australia is a complex, which in addition to meeting the country’s cash-demand, has 
specialized in the exportation of banknotes to other countries, and is known for the high quality of its 
plastic-substrate banknotes.   14
structural changes, such as the dollarization processes in Ecuador and El Salvador during 
this period, lead to central banks or government ceasing to be concerned with this task. 
      In the group of other developing countries, the proportion of central banks that print 
their own banknotes is higher than in the other two groups, although more than one half 
does not carry it out at all. In some cases, the government performs this activity, although 
it is more frequent for the government to import notes from other countries. Some central 
banks that import banknotes are those from Malaysia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Croatia. A 
different practice is that of Bulgaria’s central bank, which in the year 2002 segregated its 
banknotes press to a subsidiary firm (Printing Woks). The Polish central bank acquires 
the banknotes from a local privately-owned company. 
                   
 
Table 2.  
Central banks with Banknote Printing and Coin Minting Functions (2004) 
 















Only Coins 0.0% .. 5.9% Peru 3.2% Nepal
Production
Advanced Economies Latin America
Other Developing 
Countries
Notes & Coins 10.0% 11.8% 19.4%
25.8% Only Notes 20.0% 5.9% Mexico
 
 
                 * Norway’s central bank is planning to delegate this activity in 2007 
                  ** Under a joint venture with De la Rue. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Central Banks Annual Reports and Bank Note Printers Directory (2000–2004) 
 
       
      Table  2  also  shows  that  coin  minting is a function that very few central banks 
perform directly. This function has been traditionally carried out by governments, 
although the production has been assigned to private companies in some countries. In the 
advanced economies group only the central banks of Ireland, Greece and Denmark 
perform this function directly. In Austria, as occurred with the banknotes press, the 
central bank segregated coin production to a subsidiary in 2000. Coin minting in Finland   15
is carried out by a private company, Mint of Finland Ltd., the same that has been 
producing coins for Sweden since 2002. Coin production in Hong Kong is performed by 
UK Royal Mint and Royal Canadian Mint. 
      Only three Latin American central banks mint their own coins (Peru, Venezuela, and 
Colombia), whereas this function is performed by the government in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico. Likewise, coin minting is mostly a government function in the group 
of other developing countries. The only central banks of this group that mint coins are 
those of Serbia, Morocco, The Philippines, Albania, Armenia, and Nepal.   
       
D.  Payment Systems Operation 
 
      One of central banks’ major objectives is to look after the efficiency and security of 
payment systems. Due to the systemic risk involved in inter-bank transactions and the 
monetary interventions made by central banks through these mechanisms, the role central 
banks play in payment systems operation and supervision is central for the well 
performance of the economy  (See, BIS, 2005a).  
      As  to  payment  systems  efficiency, Khiaonarong (2003) found three different 
approaches taken by central banks in their operation: minimalist, public, and competitive. 
These approaches differ in the degree of participation of central banks and cost-recovery 
policy, and have an impact on the efficiency of payment systems
16. Similarly, the author 
considers that payment systems should be studied independently according to the value 
or volume of transactions. Therefore, to the effects of this paper, the operation of retail 
and large-value payment systems was studied separately. 
 
     a) Retail Payment Systems  
 
      Retail  payment  systems  (RPS)  are  used for minor inter-bank transferences and 
payments made with credit cards, debit cards and checks. Central banks differ in the 
operation of these systems because some of them do it directly, whereas others have 
established independent partnerships with financial entities, and in some others, both 
central banks and private entities manage their own systems and may or may not compete 
with each other. Whenever central banks do not operate directly the payment systems, 
they play an over-sighting role.  
                                                 
16 Classifying the sample of central banks under the three said approaches is a laborious task that requires 
an independent study in which we are actually working. Annex 3 describes the approaches and gives some 
examples for a several group of central banks. 
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      On the other hand, RPS may be operated either manually or automatically. Manual 
operation, particularly when related to check clearance, is labor-intensive. However, in 
some countries both manual and automated RPS coexist.  
      Figure  4  shows  the  proportion  of  central banks directly operating RPS, and its 
processing mechanism (automated or manual). As can be seen, only one third of the 
central banks in the advanced economies group operate RPS directly; this includes the 
central banks of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the FED. The FED plays a different role, 
because it competes directly with the private sector in all the systems, and maintains a 
full cost-recovery policy, legally supported by the Monetary Control Act of 1980
17.  
       
 
Figure 4.  
Central Banks Operating Directly Retail Payment Systems (RPS) and its  
Processing Mechanism (2000, 2004)  
 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on BIS Central Banks Reports on Payment Systems (2000-2004) and the Central Banks  
              Annual Reports (2000–2004)  
       
      More than 65% of the central banks in the advanced economies group have created 
partnerships with financial entities for payment systems operation. Most of these changes 
                                                 
17 This law provides that the FED must set fees that allow for the recovery of all direct and indirect costs, 
and to guarantee a return on capital, as a private firm would do. From that time onwards, the enforcement 
of this regulation has resulted in great improvements in the efficiency of payment systems (See, Bauer and 
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took place during the 80’s with the central bank of Canada starting the process, followed 
by England’s central bank
18.  
      In this group, RPS are operated automatically by most central banks. Only the banks 
of Cyprus and Portugal do it manually. Cyprus’s central bank has found this to be the 
most efficient way to operate due to the small size of the financial system and the high 
costs that automation would carry. In Portugal, the manual system coexists with 
automated systems pertaining to private entities, but they do not compete with each other 
because the central bank’s manual system operates in small towns where the private 
sector is absent. During the period under study, the only change occurred in France’s 
central bank, which ceased to operate manually the Provincial Clearing Houses and 
authorized a privately-owned automated clearing house to assume this role.  
      Most  Latin  American  central  banks  operate directly RPS. As to the processing 
mechanism, central banks have shown a strong trend towards automation after the initial 
reforms implemented by the central banks of Mexico and Colombia at the beginning of 
the 90’s. The most recent automation processes took place in Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic. However, the central banks of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay still operate 
manually these payment systems. 
      In  many  cases,  automation  has  also  resulted in changes in the administration of 
payment systems through the creation of associations with financial entities in which the 
central bank maintains a significant interest, but without using its own staff. This obeys 
to the necessity of sharing with the financial sector the elevated costs involved in these 
automation processes
19. Examples of central banks that have ceased to operate retail 
                                                 
18 The central bank of Canada has delegated the operation of both retail and large-value payment systems, 
and has limited its role to oversight, and to provide accounts-settlement services. Since 1980 the Canadian 
Payments Association (CPA), conformed by financial institutions and the central bank, operates the two 
national payment systems: the LVTS, for large-value transactions, and the ACSS for retail transactions. 
The CPA operates as a non-profit organization and maintains a full cost recovery policy (Dingle, 2003). In 
England the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) has been operating both retail and large-
value payment systems since 1985. This association is conformed by commercial banks, financial 
institutions, building companies, and the central bank. The APACS assumed the control of the firms 
CHAPS Clearing Company, BACS Ltd. and Cheque and Credit Clearing Company Ltd., which used to 
operate payment systems independently. Given its private nature, it follows a full cost recovery policy. 
Since then, the central bank has limited its functions to oversight payment systems. 
 
19 Costs and investments involved in automating and updating payment systems are in general very high. 
To this respect, Khiaonarong (2005) showed that these costs were above USD $28 million in the SEACEN 
countries during the period 2000-2004. 
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systems directly are Brazil in 2001 and Peru in 2000. Previously, the central banks of 
Argentina and Mexico ceased to perform this task in 1997 and 1995, respectively
20.  
      In the group of other developing countries the percentage of central banks operating 
retail payment systems directly approaches is 85%, the highest amongst the studied 
groups. Some central banks discussed here are those of Malaysia, Hungary, Slovenia and 
Georgia. Likewise, an increase has been observed in the automation of payment systems, 
although more than one fourth of the central banks still operate them manually. Among 
the banks that have ceased to operate these systems directly are those from Bulgaria, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Thailand, with the latter having made the change during 
the period under analysis. 
   
      b) Large-Value Payment Systems 
 
      Almost all central banks operate large-value payment systems (LVPS) directly due to 
the high risk involved in these transactions. However, some central banks, such as 
Canada’s and England’s, have delegated the LVPS operation to the same associations 
that operate RPS, although the central banks maintain settlement accounts for financial 
agents and provides final settlement of payments among participants. Additionally, they 
play a over-sighting role
21.  
      Among central banks differences are mainly presented on the processing mechanism 
(manual or automated) of these systems. Figure 5 shows that the proportion of central 
banks currently operating LVPS manually in advanced economies is very low (3,3%). 
Also, it’s noticeable that during the period central banks from Latin America and other 
developing countries initiated a strong trend towards automation
22. 
                                                 
20 Differences still remain in the region on cost recovery and subsidies policies. For example, Venezuela’s 
central bank does not charge any fee, and subsidizes all of the transactions. In Nicaragua, a symbolic fee is 
charged, with most of the operation being subsidized by the government, whereas in Costa Rica all 
operation costs are recovered through fees. In the other countries of the region cost recovery is partial (See, 
CEMLA, 2003). For other differences in payment systems within the region, see Arango and Bernal 
(2003). 
 
21 Something similar occurs with the central bank of Chile, which in April 2004 implemented a real-time 
gross settlement system (RTGS) for operations made by the Large-value Clearing House Combanc, a 
company operated by commercial banks and oversighted by the central bank (For more details, see 
Herrera, 2006). 
 
22 In the Latin American region, Colombia’s central bank has led the implementation of policies aimed at 
improving intra-day liquidity of systems operating under the RTGS system (See, Bernal and Merlano, 
2005). 
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            Currently, only 7 out of the 78 central banks of the sample operate large-value 
payment systems manually. These are: Albania, Egypt, Rumania, Paraguay, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Cyprus. As with retail systems, the central bank of Cyprus is the only one 
operating large-value systems manually in the group of advanced economies, because it 
has considered this to be more efficient given the low number of transactions and the 
high costs involved in automation.      
      Also worth noting, competition for this type of payment systems between the central 
bank and a private agent is uncommon. The most representative case is that of the United 
States, where the FED also competes with the private sector for the operation of LVPS. 
Another interesting case is Argentina, where two private companies in addition to the 
central bank operate large-value systems. However, no direct competition exists because 
the central bank operates a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, whereas private 
entities operate a multilateral net-off system




Central Banks Operating Large-value Payment Systems (LVPS) Manually 
(2000, 2004)  
 
  
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BIS Reports on Payment Systems (2000-2004) and the Central Banks Annual 





                                                 























2.3. CENTRAL BANK STAFF COSTS 
 
       After examining staff sizes and labor-intensive functions, a question on staff costs 
arises. The study by Mendzela (2003) was the first to compare cost levels. Using data 
from the year 2001, he estimated indicators relating gross operational expenses to 
population and GDP as a measure of efficiency in 18 OECD central banks. With 
information from the same year, McKinley and Banaian (2005) calculated average 
expenses per employee in 32 central banks and used this as an input to their model 
designed to estimate operational efficiency.   
      However, a closer approach was made by Brione (2005) in his comparison of 28 
OECD central banks between 1999 and 2004. This author found wide differences 
between the staff costs of central banks, which could obey to the heterogeneity of 
functions they develop. He suggests that a deeper insight should be taken into the tasks 
performed by central banks in order to get better comparisons. 
      Under a similar view, this section analyzes the staff costs of 66 of the 78 central 
banks studied above
24. For these data to reflect the differences related to the acquisitive 
capacity of the wages, staff costs were calculated on a per-employee basis using the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate during the period 2000-2004. 
      Figure 6 shows that central banks from advanced economies had the highest costs per 
employee during this period. For the year 2004, these costs were on average 20% above 
the whole sample, and 50% higher than those observed in the group of other developing 
countries. On the other hand, Latin American central banks exhibited costs per employee 
very close to the average of the sample.  
     The largest increase in staff costs during these five years occurred in the group of 
other developing countries (27.3%), a result that could be interpreted as an adjustment in 
the face of a certain lag with respect to the world average. However, it should be noted 
that staff costs also sustained significant increases in the central banks of advanced 
economies (19.6%). In contrast with what occurred in these groups, Latin American 
central banks exhibited the lowest increase during the period (4.3%). 
 
                                                 
24 Staff costs include: wages, mandatory legal contributions to schemes of social security and additional 
benefits (social welfare, additional health programs, and compensations, among others, with training and 
travel expenses excluded). Data on staff costs were obtained from the Financial Statements of Central 
Banks Annual Reports. Central banks excluded from the sample due to lack of detailed information were: 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Paraguay, Qatar, Serbia 
and Montenegro, and Venezuela.  
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Figure 6. 























 Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Central Banks Financial Statements and Annual Reports (2000-2004) and IMF 
(2005). 
  
       
     For  a  more  detailed  analysis,  central bank staff costs were compared within each 
group. Figure 7 shows that the highest cost per employee in 2004 in the group of 
advanced economies were found in the central banks of Israel followed by Hong Kong, 
Finland, and Austria
25. The highest increases during the period (above 50%) occurred at 
the central banks of Luxembourg and Iceland. In contrast, the only central banks that 
exhibited reductions were those of Italy and New Zealand, this latter, together with 
Korea, Ireland, and Kuwait, showing the lowest staff costs in the year 2004.     
     Brazil’s central bank has the highest staff costs in the whole Latin American region. 
The highest increases during the period (close to 20%) occurred in Ecuador and Costa 
Rica, although the latter has the lowest costs in the region. The only reduction took place 
at Bolivia’s central bank.   
       
 
                                                 
25 In the case of Israel, this confirms a recent concern raised by Mr. Stanley Fisher, Governor of the Central 
Bank, who has led significant reforms in the contracting scheme aimed at curtailing high staff costs. One of 
his relevant proposals is for new employees to be engaged with wages 30% below those currently in force, 
a concept largely supported by a recent paper that shows that average wages in the Bank of Israel are 
among the highest in the whole country (Central Banking, 2005b). For more details on Fisher’s proposals, 
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Figure 7.  































































































































































































































12 0 .0 0 0














































































































































































































































































































(Dollars PPP) 2000 2004
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Banks Financial Statements, Annual Reports (2000-2004) and IMF (2005).    23
      In the group of other developing countries, Indonesia’s central bank has the highest 
staff costs, with an increase of more than 50% during the period. However, the largest 
increases in the 5-year period (i.e., above 100%) occurred in Poland, Bangladesh, and 
Turkey, with the greatest reductions (above 15%) being those of Romania, Macedonia 
and Georgia. The banks with the lowest costs in this group are Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Albania. 
 
3.   LABOR DEMAND AT CENTRAL BANKS 
 
      This section delves deeply into the theoretical aspects of the labor-demand function 
and its application for central banks. Recent studies on labor demand in central banks and 
the estimations of the econometric model are discussed. 
 
 
3.1.   LABOR-DEMAND FUNCTION 
 
      The microeconomic theory indicates that labor, being a production factor, will be 
demanded as the demand for other goods or services increases. Therefore, the demand for 
labor is conceived as a derived demand since it depends on the good or service it 
contributes to produce or provide (McConnell et al., 2005).  
      In order to verify this premise, let us assume that a firm engages two production 
factors: labor (L) and capital (K), in order to produce a final good (Y); with the real wage 
(w) and the unit cost of the capital (r), representing the relative prices of the two factors 
considered. Thus, for the firm to maximize benefits a minimum cost function that relates 
price and optimum amount of each factor should exist. This cost function will also 
depend on the production level and on the price of the factors: 
 
(1)                                                ) , , (
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      Once the cost function is defined, demand for labor can be found by applying the 
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      Equation  (2)  above  shows  that  labor  demand  (
d L ) is a function of the relation 
between costs and output level. Since this is a short-term demand, labor is assumed to be 
the only variable factor. Therefore, for the purposes of the econometric estimation the 
equation (2) can be expressed as a log-linear function as follows (See, Hamermesh, 
1993):       
 
(3)                                                                                                                                        
       
      Equation (3) shows that a firm’s short-term labor demand will depend primarily on 
the labor-output elasticity ( 1 α ) and on the labor-real wage elasticity ( 2 α ). As will be 
shown hereinafter, this approach is closer to the case of the central banks. 
 
A. Empirical Evidence 
 
      Literature on labor demand in central banks is scarce. One of the first approaches was 
made by Vaubel (1997), who selected some of the central bank’s functions as proxies of 
its output, and also considered variables such as number of inhabitants, per-capita GDP, 
and geographic area as measures of the magnitude of a central bank’s output. The author 
intended to identify the impact of the central bank’s independence on the staff and for 
this he also used some institutional variables (e.g., indicators of central bank 
independence, and exchange rate regime).  
      Later on, Vaubel (2002) calculated a similar model for a group of 21 central banks 
from OECD countries, further linking banknote printing, currency quality check, and 
securities management as proxies of central bank’s output
26. The study intended to find 
the staff the European Central Bank should have in relation with the size of the staff of 
central banks within the Euro zone and other advanced economies. 
In a recent study, Banco de la República (2005) estimated a labor-demand 
function for 133 central banks using data from the years 1998 and 2003. In contrast with 
Vaubel’s works, this paper included payment systems operation and coin minting 
variables (See, Table 3).     
      Although Vaubel’s works have shed light on the role of labor demand at a central 
bank, both of them have limitations in the set of variables selected. A possible 
                                                 
26 In contrast with the model stated by Vaubel (1997), this model excludes geographic area, participation in 
central banks associations, and monetary base (M1), because these variables had exhibited no significance 





it  e w Y L  + + + =  ln ln ln  2 1 0 α  α  α   25
explanation for this may be that these works are focused on a more institutional 
perspective (Public Choice) than on labor economy. Therefore, aspects such as the 
central bank’s independence and exchange rate regime are given a greater importance 
than those about the performance of operative functions. 
      On the other hand, Banco de la República (2005) analyzes a wider array of functions 
in a relevant sample of central banks (133), thus having a greater robustness to its 
estimations. However, as with the above-discussed models, these estimations are cross 
sections examining the situation at a given point in time. For this reason, they do not link 
the effects on the staff that could be exercised by changes in the central bank’s functions 
over time. 
             
 
Table 3.  





- Monetary Supply (M1) - Population (in millions)
- Financial Supervision - GDP per capita (USD) (n= 97) 1993 MCO
- Central bank independence - Geographic area  Cross-section
- Exchange rate regime
- Participation in central banks  
Association
- Banknote Printing - Population (in millions)
- Currency quality check - GDP per capita (USD) (n=21) 1999 MCO
Cross-section
- Central bank independence
- Exchange rate regime
- Financial Supervision - Population (in millions)
- RPS Operation 4/ - GDP per capita (USD) (n=133) 1998 MCO
Banco de la - Manual operation of RPS 4/ Cross-section
República (2005) - Banknote Printing





- Discounting of private bills of    








 1/ Variables included in the models as proxies of central bank’s output. All models use the number of central banks   
      employees as a dependent variable and also use log- linear functions.   
 2/ Number of central banks included in the sample          
 3/ Year of information for which a staff estimation was made      
 4/ Retail payment systems  
      
 
 Source: Vaubel (1997; 2002) and Banco de la República (2005)   
 
       
      From the theoretical standpoint, the works discussed hereinabove also share their 
exclusion of the labor factor price to characterize the labor-demand function, under the   26
assumption of a very low employment-wage elasticity in central banks. However, as the 
previous section has shown, the theory indicates that real wages should be included in the 
labor-demand function. 
 
B. The Model 
 
      Following  the  specifications  of  equation (3) above, short-term labor demand for 
central banks is given by:  
 
(4)      + + + + + + = ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( 5 4 3 2 1 0 it it it it it i it BP Ln B CO Ln B S Ln B Y Ln B N Ln B B L Ln    
                          ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . 9 8 7 6 it it it it LVPSm Ln B RPSm Ln B RPSat Ln B CM Ln B + + + + 
                          it it u W Ln B + ) ( 10                                                                                                                       
 
      In equation (4) a central bank’s staff (L) is a function of the country’s population (N), 
GDP per-capita (Y), and previously discussed operative functions. These functions are 
represented with dummy variables and are referred to financial system supervision (S), 
currency operations (CO), banknote printing (BP), coin minting (CM), automated 
operation of retail payment systems (RPSat), manual operation of retail payment systems 
(RPSm),  and manual operation of large-value payment systems (LVPSm). Finally, a 
proxy to real wages is included (W).  
      Functions  included  in  the  model  are those in which the central bank has a high 
operational component, and labor intensive. Some core functions (e.g., monetary policy 
conduction, international reserves management) are not segregated in the model because 
they are homogeneous functions across all central banks. However, the model’s constant 
is assumed to capture the minimal staff devoted to these functions. 
      On the other hand, the variables of GDP per-capita and number of inhabitants are 
deemed to serve as measures of the magnitude of the central banks’ output, and these 
variables are expected to have a positive sign
27. For real wage, its relation with the 
demanded amount of labor is assumed to be inverse and a negative effect is to be 
expected on the central bank’s labor demand (See Annexes 4 and 5). 
                                                 
27 Economic magnitude variables are very relevant for our analysis, since they allow differentiating the size 
of the activities developed by central banks. For example, transactions volume or currency demand in the 
United States are different from those of other countries largely due to the high level of economic 
development and extensive population as compared with the activity of a country such as, let us say, 
Estonia or Costa Rica.  
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C.  Methodology  
 
      In order to estimate equation (4), a panel data model with dynamic effects was used, 
with the following expression:  
 
(5)                                                       it it it u X y + = β  
 
Equation (5) represents the traditional panel model, wherein  it Y  is the dependent 
variable that varies for each central bank i (i = 1, ..., 66) during any given period of time t 
(t = 2000,...,2004), it X  is referred to the set of explanatory variables, and  it u  represents 
the error term, which at its turn is composed of: 
 
(6)                                                        it i it u ε μ + =  
 
In expression (6),  i μ  represents individual effect (either fixed or random) and  it ε  
is observation error
28. In practice, including an estimator with dynamic effects generates 
differentiation because different values are allocated to each observation, thus admitting 
differences in the minimal staff between central banks
29. Similarly, the usefulness of 
implementing a panel model lies in that it allows to examine dynamic changes in time 




      The model stated in equation (4) was estimated through the generalized least squares 
(GLS) method and under the random-effects condition that results from applying 
Hausman’s test.  For the first estimation (Model 1), coin minting (CM) and manual 
operation of large-value payment systems (LVPSm) variables were non-significant; 
moreover, they showed a wrong sing to the expected one. Therefore, a new estimation 
was made with the exclusion of these variables. In the new estimation (Model 2), output 
                                                 
28 The difference between a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model resides in that the latter 
adduces a random variable that changes for each individual, whereas in the former the effect is a fixed 
number. The selection of the model depends on the correlation between the individual effect and the 
explanatory variable, which is reviewed with Hausman’s test (See, Hsiao, 2003). 
 
29 An interesting exercise would be to obtain different coefficients for all variables at each central bank by 
using a Swamy model. However, the number of years from which data were obtained is very short and 
does not allow using this type of models (See Amemiya, 1978).  
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magnitude variables, i.e., GDP per capita (Y) and population (N), showed a high degree 
of significance
30. 
      Table  4  shows  that  of  all  functions, financial supervision (S) had the highest 
significance and coefficient, suggesting that changes in its operation have the largest 
impact on the central bank staff. This finding is supported by the case of Ireland’s central 
bank, which increased its staff in 226 employees (22%) between 2003 and 2004, when it 
assumed the financial supervision function. 
       
                      
 




Dependent Variable Ln(L) - Panel Data (330 Obs.) - Random Effects - GLS Regression 
                                     
                                     
                     Variables            Model 1                       Model 2 
 
Intercept           0.9040 (2.01)**  0.8652 (1.93)** 
 
Ln (N)    0.6450 (17.82)***   0.6489  (17.98)*** 
Ln (Y)     0.0730 (2.61)***    0.0816  (2.92) *** 
Ln (S)     0.1958 (3.09)***   0.1962    (3.08)*** 
Ln (CO)   0.1439 (2.55)**  0.1504  (2.65)*** 
Ln (BPl)   0.1186 (2.08)**  0.1099  (1.96) ** 
Ln (CM)      W.S. (-0.64)                     .. 
Ln (RPSm)   0.1643 (2.58)**  0.0910  (1.64)* 
Ln (RPSat)   0.0406 (0.75)    0.0179  (0.34) 
Ln (LVPSm)      W.S. (-0.69)                     .. 
Ln (W)             -0.0728 (-2.54)**              -0.0804 (-2.80)*** 
 
   
R-sq              0.8207                      0.8184 
Wald (p-value)       379.89 (0.00)           375.24 (0.00) 




 Symbols (***,**,*) indicate that the statistics are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
 Statistics are shown between parentheses.         
 W.S: Wrong sign         
 Wald’s test: Joint significance of the variables (Prob. > Chi 2)         
 Hausman’s test: Differences in coefficients are not systematic (Prob. > Chi 2)   
 Source: Authors’ calculations  
       
      The findings on the currency operations (CO) variable were consistent with both 
theoretical position and empirical evidence, because this function encompasses numerous 
                                                 
30 These results are consistent with the estimations of Vaubel (1997; 2002) and Banco de la República 
(2005), which also used these variables as measures of the magnitude of central banks’ output. 
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activities that typically are labor-intensive due to their extensive infrastructure
31. 
Likewise, the coefficient suggests that when a central bank changes the operations of this 
function through a traditional model for other less interventionists schemes (e.g., sharing, 
participative, or freelance), a significant staff reduction should be expected. 
     The  banknote  printing  (BP) function was also significant, indicating this to be a 
relevant function for determining labor demand. This could obey to the fact that its direct 
operation involves a large industrial infrastructure and a trained staff devoted exclusively 
to this task
32. Likewise, manual operation of retail payment systems (RPSm) was 
significant at 10%. This shows the impact of manual processes on these systems (e.g., 
manual clearing of checks). In contrast, the variable that represents automated operations 
of retail payment systems (RPSat) was non-significant, but showed the expected sign, 
suggesting that when these payment systems are automated, the staff a central bank needs 
is very small, although probably more specialized or highly trained.  
      On the other hand, the real-wage variable (W) was highly significant, and had the 
expected negative sign. However, the coefficient shows that labor-wage elasticity is 
lower in central banks than in private firms
33. This could also suggest the presence of a 
certain budgetary flexibility in central banks, a feature already highlighted by Heikensten 
(2003).  
       
3.3. ESTIMATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON  
 
      Based on the results of the model, a staff prediction was carried out with the purpose 
of comparing central banks and identifying recent changes in their labor demand during 
the period 2000-2004. These results should not be interpreted as measures of efficiency
34. 
Staff deviations from predicted values represent either staff excesses or deficits, possibly 
                                                 
31 For example, in 1998 Sweden’s central bank implemented a currency operations participative model that 
resulted in 250 employees being transferred to a new enterprise (PSAB), and other 75 employees accepted 
a voluntary retirement plan (See, Sveriges Riksbank, 2006) 
 
32 As was shown in a previous section, a significant number of central banks have established partnerships 
with private operators for banknote printing (e.g., Australia, Portugal, and Austria), or have completely 
delegated this function (e.g., Sweden, England, Finland). 
 
33 Comparing a wide group of countries, Hammerseh (1993) found that labor-wage elasticity for 
homogeneous labor, both in private firms and in the economy’s aggregate, ranges between 0.15 and 0.75, 
that is, far above the value recorded in the central banks under study (0.08). 
 
34 This is opposite to the results interpretation made by Vaubel (1997). Estimating efficiency measures 
require linking inputs and outputs directly through either a cost or production function to finding an 
efficient frontier for the comparison.  Mester (2003) provide a discussion on the techniques for measuring 
efficiency in central banks.  
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associated with differences in labor productivity. Also, they might be attributable to some 
other factors not directly captured by the model (e.g., organizational structure, 
bureaucracy, technology and staff qualification), but related with the staff size.  
 
A.  Advanced Economies 
 
      Estimation results of this group from the year 2000 indicate that more than one half 
central banks (55.2%) had a staff larger than the model’s prediction. However, an 
adjustment implying a reversion of this staff-related status was noticed in the year 2004. 
In fact, 16 out of 29 central banks recorded a staff smaller than the estimate. Among 
these central banks are those from Canada and Belgium, which had the most overstaffed 
central bank in the year 2000, whereas for 2004 they recorded a staff below the estimate 
in 10.2% and 9.7%, respectively. A similar situation was observed in another important 
group of central banks (e.g, Germany, Spain, United States, and England). In contrast, 
the largest staff excesses in 2004 were seen at the central banks of Iceland, Singapore and 
Switzerland, with a positive deviation of about 8% (See Table 5 and Annex 6). 
 
B.  Latin America 
 
      The results of the staff estimations for Latin American central banks suggest that for 
the year 2000, 71.4% of central banks in this group were overstaffed. For the year 2004 
the staff adjustment in the region was of 8%, this being the largest average adjustment 
among the groups of comparison. The most favorable changes occurred in Ecuador, 
Dominican Republic, and Colombia
35. In spite of its extensive adjustment, the central 
bank of Costa Rica continued being the largest overstaffed of the region. 
 
C.  Other Developing Countries 
 
      Staff estimates in other developing countries show that in 2000, 52% of the central 
banks were overstaffed. For 2004, central banks from European Union member or 
candidate countries were seen to make significant staff reductions and to sustain the 
largest adjustments versus the estimates. (e.g. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria). 
In contrast, most of smallest central banks presented important staff increases during the 
                                                 
35 In the case of the Ecuador’s central bank this wide difference could be attributed in part to the recent 
process of dollarization of its economy. Results for Colombia’s central bank are analyzed in Annex 7.   31






Deviation of Actual from Predicted Staff in Central Banks 
(2000-2004) 
 
País 2000 2004 País 2000 2004 País 2000 2004
Australia 0,17% 0,15% Argentina -0,06% -1,87% Albania -12,49% 12,06%
Austria -5,60% -10,26% Bolivia 2,57% -6,37% Armenia -2,86% 8,26%
Belgium 16,07% -9,72% Brazil -3,99% 3,20% Azerbaijan 12,83% 11,65%
Canada 22,81% -10,24% Chile 4,16% -3,39% Bangladesh 6,92% -2,85%
Cyprus -5,02% 1,52% Colombia 13,28% -8,23% Belarus -7,71% -1,32%
Denmark -1,15% 3,25% Costa Rica 32,44% 19,97% Bosnia & H. -19,74% 7,20%
England 8,95% -3,97% Dominican Rep. 8,16% -15,69% Bulgaria 18,73% -4,15%
Finland -1,98% -10,99% Ecuador 9,10% -31,11% Croatia 0,85% -6,07%
France 2,57% -6,94% Guatemala -5,12% 9,22% Czech Rep. -0,18% -0,07%
Germany 7,20% -12,99% Nicaragua -0,62% -1,77% Estonia -23,66% -5,15%
Greece 5,27% -5,32% Peru 0,90% -4,09% Georgia 7,35% 15,42%
Hong Kong 1,10% -1,64% Uruguay 12,23% -1,40% Hungary 20,70% -10,15%
Iceland -7,60% 8,20% Indonesia 2,68% -4,24%
Ireland -9,40% 2,08% Jordan -1,62% 5,42%
Israel 5,62% -5,78% Kenya -17,95% -4,67%
Italy 6,37% -7,87% Latvia -0,26% 4,64%
Japan 4,91% -5,51% Macedonia 1,30% 13,79%
Kuwait -3,15% 4,48% Malta -0,54% -0,04%
Luxembourg -15,77% 6,81% Philippines 23,36% -1,34%
Netherlands 0,97% 0,50% Poland 40,37% -11,35%
New Zealand 11,21% 3,29% Romania -2,18% -28,87%
Norway -12,27% -3,47% Slovakia -0,09% 2,36%
Portugal 2,47% -7,56% Slovenia 11,96% 3,90%
S. Korea -1,99% 2,78% Thailand 4,98% -2,92%





Mean 0,51% -2,47% 6,09% -3,46% 2,56% -0,28%
SD 8,83% 6,58% 10,23% 12,47% 14,05% 9,52%
Advanced Economies Latin America Other Developing Countries
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations       
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
      This paper shows that most central banks sustained significant staff reductions, with 
the cases of England, Germany, and the United States being worth noting. In Latin 
America the central banks of Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Colombia should also be   32
mentioned, whereas for other developing countries, the most important reductions were 
carried on by the banks of Romania, Poland, and Hungary, also driven by their access to 
the European Union. 
However, central bank staff reductions were accompanied by an increase in their 
costs, which could be largely attributed to a higher degree of specialization of the staff, 
often resulting from their focusing on their core functions. Overall, as central banks cease 
to perform operative functions, they will require less low-qualified personnel, resulting in 
an increase in the ratio of highly qualified employees and, in the short term, in higher 
staff costs. 
            In the past few years the quest for efficiency in most central banks has driven 
modernization strategies based on the private sector’s active participation, primarily in 
functions such as operation of payment systems, currency operations, and banknote 
printing. In fact, this paper identifies the existence of multiple modalities for the 
performance of the operative functions in central banks. Strategies differ widely between 
countries, thus reflecting the role of the private sector, the central bank-government 
relationship, and historical traditions. Also, it should be taken into account the existence 
of external factors in some countries, such as a strict regulatory environment, that avoid 
central banks from delegating part of their activities. 
      On the other hand, our empirical exercise succeeded in identifying the relevance of 
operative functions in determining labor demand at central banks. In particular, financial 
supervision was found to have a large impact on central bank staff, as well as, going from 
a traditional model to a less interventionist scheme in currency operations. Similarly, low 
employment-wage elasticity was identified suggesting the existence of a flexible 
budgetary constrain in central banks. This highlights the efforts made by some central 
banks to control the growth of their staffs.  
      We deem that these findings are highly relevant for central banks, governments, and 
central banking organizations. Likewise, we recognize that this paper could be extended 
and delve deeply into several other directions. In particular, efficiency measures by 
functions should be estimated in order to identify the best practices for central banks. 
With this purpose, part of our research agenda is focused on measuring efficiency by 
functions, comparing central banks with different efficient-frontier techniques.   
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Cultural Activity at the Central Banks 
 
The cultural activity developed by central banks is for the most part related to libraries and 
museums. The vast majority of central banks only have a small numismatic exhibition, usually 
inside their premises, and a library specialized in economic and financial matters for their 
researchers. In advanced economies, for example, only the central banks of Switzerland, 
Germany and the United States have more than one library open to the public, and these are only 
of a specialized nature. Similarly, only Finland, Italy, and Belgium have one or two museums 
larger than the average. 
 
Something similar occurs within the group of other developing countries. Only the central banks 
of Malta, the Philippines and Pakistan have a library open to the general public, and only the 
library of this latter country contains works on matters other than economics and finances. As to 
the museums, only the central banks of Morocco, Rumania, Malaysia, and Thailand have a 
sizable numismatic or thematic museum. 
 
Of the three groups of countries, Latin America is the region where the cultural activity 
developed by central banks is more notorious due to the historical and political legacy of their 
governments. Since their establishment, most central banks in the region were given the 
responsibility of approaching people through cultural activities because of the lack of state 
policies on this matter. The majority of these central banks have at least one library open to the 
public, either specialized in economic matters, or of general purpose, that include social, artistic, 
and historic works.  
 
However, the only central banks in these countries that maintain a significant network of libraries 
are those from Guatemala, with 53, and Colombia with 19. Likewise, the 6 museums of Ecuador 
and the 8 museums managed by the central bank in Colombia are worth noting. It is important to 
say that some central banks, such as those of Guatemala, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, have chosen to 
assign the administration of their libraries or museums to non-profit organizations to which the 
central banks only contribute with financial resources. 
 
 
Source: Central Banks Annual Reports (2000-2004) 
 




Payment Systems Operation at the Central Banks  
 
Khiaonarong (2003) identified three approaches to how central banks operate payment systems. 
These approaches differ primarily in the degree of participation of the private sector and the 
existence of a cost-recovery policy. For a better understanding of this classification, the following 
table shows some examples of countries that fall within each approach. 
 
 
Approaches in the Payment Systems Operation 
 
 




The central bank owns and operates only large-
value payment systems or limits itself to 
providing account settlement services.
The private sector operates low-value systems, 
generally through commercial banks 
associations. 
The central banks owns and operates all or most 
payment systems.
When the private sector participates, it does not 
compete with the central bank
Competitive
The central bank operates most payment 
systems and competes directly with the private 
sector.
Cost recovery is total United States
England 
Canada         
New Zealand    
Sweden          
Australia          
Brazil         
Mexico
There is generally a 
total cost recovery 
policy.
Minimalist
Germany       
Spain        
Italy         
Costa Rica        
Venezuela




    
 
 





















Variables used in the Model by Groups of Countries (2000-2004) 
 
 
Variable Max. Min. Mean SD
L 23.438             105                  2.341               3.804              
N 293.028           281                  30.245             52.713            
Y 63.727             316                  12.152             12.605            
W 127.446           2.984               40.606             29.290            
L 23.438             105                  3.240               5.331              
N 293.028           281                  32.059             56.742            
Y 63.727             9.276               24.621             9.598              
W 127.446           6.435               66.583             24.313            
L 4.694               437                  1.328               1.116              
N 184.101           3.324               26.358             44.521            
Y 7.675               435                  2.422               1.514              
W 73.825             6.025               27.175             14.166            
L 6.375               184                  1.865               2.030              
N 238.453           390                  30.317             52.367            
Y 14.988             316                  3.137               2.992              
W 80.793             2.984               17.994             11.868            
Latin America (n=12)





   
   L: Number of employees of central banks 
   N: Population in thousands of inhabitants 
   Y: GDP per-capita in constant UDS of 2000 
   W: Annual cost per employee in constant USD of 2000 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, US Census Bureau, IMF   
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Annex 5.
2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Austria .. .. Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
B e l g i u m . .. . Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
C a n a d a . .. . Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
Cyprus Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes .. ..
D e n m a r k . .. .. .. . Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. . Y e s Y e s
England .. .. .. .. Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Finland .. .. Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. ..
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Hong Kong Yes Yes  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
I c e l a n d . .. . Y e s Y e s . .. . Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .
Ireland .. Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Israel Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
J a p a n . .. . Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
Kuwait Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Luxembourg .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
New Zealand Yes Yes  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
N o r w a y . .. . Y e s . . Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
Portugal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. ..
S. Korea  .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Singapore Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sweden .. .. .. .. Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Switzerland .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
USA Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 00000000000000
Argentina Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Bolivia .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes .. .. ..
Brazil Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes .. Yes .. .. ..
Chile .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Colombia .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Costa Rica .. .. Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ecuador .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. Yes Yes .. Yes .. .. ..
Guatemala .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes .. Yes Yes .. ..
Nicaragua .. .. Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. ..
Peru .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Dominican Rep.  .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. ..
Uruguay .. .. .. .. .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Total 33991146725222
Albania Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Armenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes
Azerbaijan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. Yes Yes .. Yes .. .. ..
Bangladesh Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. ..
Belarus Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
B o s n i a  &  H e r z . . .. . Y e s Y e s . .. . Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .
B u l g a r i a Y e s Y e s  Y e s Y e s Y e s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
Croatia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Estonia Yes .. .. .. .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Philippines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes Yes
Georgia Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. Yes Yes .. Yes .. .. ..
Hungary Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Indonesia Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Jordan Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. ..
Kenya Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Latvia .. .. Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Macedonia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Malta .. .. Yes Yes .. .. Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Czech Rep.  Yes Yes  Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Romania Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes .. ..
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey .. .. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .. .. .. .. .. ..
T o t a l 00000000000000
*  Dummy variables used in the model 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Case of Colombia’s Central Bank 
 
Like most central banks, Banco de la República (BR) has made a significant staff reduction in the 
past few years (40.6% since 1993). During the period 2000-2004 this reduction reached 12%, 
driven by function restructuring, process automation, and support-functions outsourcing (See, 
Banco de la República, 2005b). 
 
As to labor-intensive secondary and operational functions, the BR performs, mostly with its own 
resources, four out of the five core functions analyzed in this paper. Financial supervision is the 
only function not under the responsibility of the central bank because since 1923 it is performed 
by a state-owned entity (Financial Superintendence). 
 
As to currency operations, BR follows primarily a traditional model. However, freelance and 
sharing models have been implemented in some cities, thus promoting the participation of 
securities transporting firms. These changes, aimed at increasing efficiency, have resulted in a 
reduction of the bank’s network of branches associated to this function since 1997.  
 
With respect to industrial activities such as coin minting and banknote printing, these are 
performed directly by BR. Recently, the Central de Efectivo, a complex with top facilities for the 
production of banknotes and currency operations related activities, very similar to Portugal’s 
Carregado complex, came into operation. As to coin minting, BR redesigned and enhanced the 
process in its Fabrica de Moneda, which currently operates with a minimal staff (30 employees) 
and a rotary that has resulted in an improved productivity of this function. 
 
BR manages directly fully automated large-value and retail payment systems, thus being one of 
the first central banks in Latin America in having automated these processes to date. These 
changes resulted in significant staff reductions, more particularly in labor-intensive activities 
such as manual clearing of checks. Likewise, reforms implemented since the end of the 90’s 
allowed for a deeper capital market and for more efficient and safe payment systems financial 
management in Colombia (For more details, see Bernal and Merlano, 2005; Uribe, 2005a).  
 
On the other hand, cultural promotion is one of BR’s major responsibilities toward the 
community. BR has never had doubts on the continuity of this function due to its high social 
impact. In fact, BR is the central bank with the widest infrastructure and largest staff devoted to 
cultural activities in the entire central banks environment. BR operates a network of 18 libraries 
in the national territory, plus a main library located in Bogotá, which has the largest number of 
books among the libraries of all central banks (1,500,000 books). Additionally, BR operates an 
ethnographic museum and seven gold museums in the whole country. Similarly, BR organizes a 
continual program composed of diverse musical and artistic activities distributed in 15 branches 
and 12 cultural agencies (See, Uribe, 2005b). 
 
In fact, the percentage of employees devoted to these activities as of December 31
st 2004 
accounted for 15.7% (392 employees) of the total Bank’s staff, this being the most numerous 
staff of all central banks developing some cultural activity. Since the proportion of cultural 
activities developed by BR is not comparable with other central banks, and since this function is 
not taken into account within the econometric model, employees devoted to these tasks are 
excluded from the data on the BR’s staff. Model estimates for BR for the years 2000 to 2004 are 




   43
 
Deviations from Actual to Predicted Staff at the  













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
                    Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
As can be seen, in the years 2000 and 2001, BR’s was overstaffed. A breakpoint appears the year 
2002, and BR’s staff goes below the estimate. This is attributed to a 252 staff downsizing during 
that year. For the year 2004 the percent deviation from the estimate was of -8.2%, value above 
the average for the region in that year (-4.8%).  
 
 
Results from Colombia in Other Studies 
 
In Vaubel (1997) results showed that in 1993 BR had 2,076 employees in excess (45% above the 
estimate) compared with the observed staff of 4,583 in that year. Later, Banco de la República 
(2005) estimated a model for the year 2003 finding that BR had a staff 10.9% below the estimate. 
The panel data model used in this paper allows to identify the structural change that took place in 
the year 2002, that is, when the BR staff began to appear below the estimate.  
 